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Abstract 
Through the inter-war period, the USSR became an example of ‘socialism in action’ that the 
British labour movement could both look towards and define itself against. British visitors 
both criticized and acclaimed aspects of the new Soviet state between 1919 and 1925, but a 
consistently exceptional finding was the Soviet prison. Analyzing the visits and reports of 
British guests to Soviet prisons, the aims of this article are threefold. Using new material 
from the Russian archives, it demonstrates the development of an intense admiration for, and 
often a desire to replicate, the Soviet penal system on the part of Labour members, future 
Communists, and even Liberals who visited Soviet Russia. It also critically examines why, 
despite such admiration, the effect of Soviet penal ideas failed to significantly influence 
Labour Party policy in this area. Finally, placing these views within a broader framework of 
the British labour movement’s internal tussles over the competing notions of social 
democracy and communism, it is argued that a failure to affect policy should not proscribe 
reappraisals of these notions or the Soviet-Labour Party relationship, both of which were 
more complex than is currently permitted in the established historiography. 
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Throughout the inter-war period, the British labour movement’s encounters with Soviet 
Russia proved a formative experience. Attitudes towards the Soviet state varied greatly. Over 
time, the positions of the ‘moderate’ and ‘far’ left in Britain, contested most visibly by the 
Labour Party and the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) respectively, were further 
entrenched. At a fundamental level, the experiences of Soviet Russia in Britain pitted two 
competing visions of society against one another. On the one hand, the Labour Party, a 
gradualist, constitutionalist organization, pressed for social democracy; on the other, the 
CPGB sought revolutionary overthrow and the advent of a communist state. How the labour 
movement experienced Soviet Russia in its earliest years thus forms a vital part of the 
ideological history of the left in Britain. Through individual, Labour Party and Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) delegations, sceptics, moderates and believers alike visited the revolutionary 
state. Some travelled back to Britain converted; sceptics usually returned unconvinced; and 
sympathisers having seen what they wanted to see. 
This much is now commonly known, the contours of the relationship between the 
labour movement and the USSR having received a healthy amount of attention from 
historians.1 A number of broader problems, however, remain insufficiently addressed. While 
an implicitly teleological understanding of Labour’s ‘forward march’ has itself been 
challenged, it has nevertheless continued to absorb the Soviet issue, tending, for example, to 
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separate definitively Stalinism and communism from the parliamentary socialism of the 
Labour Party in the 1920s.2 As Kevin Morgan notes, as a destination in the 1930s and 
beyond, ‘nothing could be more apt’. But the process of its attainment requires revisiting.3 
Consequently, a dichotomized conflict between social democracy and communism has often 
been taken for granted, despite questions having been raised over ‘how much socialism’ the 
Labour Party felt it could commit to, or even whether the purpose of the party had been to 
create a socialist Britain.4 A further problem, symptomatic of an approach that has sought 
rigid demarcations within the left (Fabianism, co-operation, syndicalism, guild socialism, 
communism) where perhaps identities were more pliant, has been the fact that, somewhat 
paradoxically, those who appeared to have least in common with the Soviet Union often 
found most to gain there during visits. Most expressly, those ‘holding to basically non-statist 
conceptions of socialism’, like George Lansbury, a future Labour Party leader, were more 
attracted to the state-dominated socialism of the Soviet Union than British state socialists like 
Ramsay MacDonald, Labour Party Prime Minister, and Philip Snowden, his Chancellor.5  
Soviet Russia presented a complex problem for the British labour movement, whose 
members were often romanced by workers’ revolution while rejecting its actuality.6 The 
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rejection of Marxism by the Independent Labour Party (ILP), a more radical body than 
Labour itself, complicated matters further, and precipitated a conspicuous grey area on the 
left-wing political spectrum that became fertile terrain for the competing visions of British 
social democracy and communism.7 The details of this tussle, and the complicated and often 
ambiguous relationship between the left and the USSR through which it was often played out, 
have yet to be teased out in fine-grained analyses.  
Recent scholarship has begun to address this. Kevin Morgan’s Bolshevism and the 
British Left has sought to show how little the 1920s and 1930s can be ‘reduced to the 
relatively simple alignments of the immediate post-war decades’, and how a number of 
different cleavages obscure understandings of the Labour-USSR relationship. Jonathan Davis 
has re-evaluated the influence of the Soviet Union upon the British Labour Party and its 
function as an ‘exemplar’, demonstrating that, while Labour disagreed with a majority of 
Soviet policy, the USSR nevertheless became a ‘key definer’ of the Labour Party’s own 
brand of socialism.8 Both scholars have opened up a new vista within which the 
historiographical view of Labour’s inevitable ‘forward march’ can be further challenged, and 
the commonalities and distinctions between budding social democracy and communism re-
examined in greater depth.  
This article takes up the lead provided by Morgan and Davis, and seeks to embrace 
the complexities and ambiguities of the period—intensified by the Soviets’ duplicitous style 
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of cultural diplomacy—that spawned from Labour’s relationship with the Soviet Union. On 
the necessity of unearthing the complications of the socialist position, Morgan notes that 
these ambiguities are best emphasized ‘as soon as any subject is brought into sharper focus’.9 
This article takes the early visits of the British left to Soviet Russia, and specifically to Soviet 
prisons, as that subject.  
Early visitors were influential in establishing the trend of what would later be known 
as ‘fellow-travelling’, or the rise of the poputchiki. Initial journeys in 1919 were wholly 
unofficial, but were soon followed by officially sanctioned visits of the Labour Party and the 
TUC in 1920, as well as the Second International, whose delegation to Menshevik Georgia in 
the same year included future Labour Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald. The TUC returned 
to the USSR in 1924 proffering reciprocal Soviet visits to Britain, before Walter Citrine, 
made TUC General Secretary in 1925, followed them to Russia. 
The purpose of these trips for the Labour Party was generally two-fold: to witness 
first-hand the experiments of the new Soviet Government, before reporting back to the labour 
movement in Britain; and to refute the ambushes of the right-wing press that had undermined 
the non-Communist British left since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.10 But there was also 
a third, less conspicuous aim for the labour movement: to learn from Soviet Russia. Despite 
varied British responses to the Russian revolutions, pockets of enthusiasm and fascination 
among the rank-and-file of the labour movement persisted, the myth of Soviet democracy 
manufacturing an ‘emotional identification’ with the Soviet state.11 Such identification led 
                                                     
9 Morgan, Bolshevism, Part One, 16. 
10 Davis, ‘Left out in the cold’, 71. 
11 See White, ‘Soviets in Britain: the Leeds convention of 1917’, International Review of 
Social History, 19, 2 (1974), 166; Graubard, British Labour, 39-40; Davis, ‘A new socialist 
influence’, 163-4; Herald, 24 Mar 1917; Ian Bullock, Romancing the Revolution: The Myth 
of Soviet Democracy and the British Left (Alberta, 2011), 99-101; Jones, Russia Complex, 6. 
 6 
the New Statesman to ask, in early 1920, just what might be gained by studying the Soviet 
system as a ‘vital and important experiment’. Its optimistic answer was the ‘prospect of real 
improvement in the character of our own ... institutions’.12 
The visits were significant for the Bolsheviks too, who sought not only survival as a 
nascent regime, but to engineer world revolution through their revolutionary organization, the 
Communist International (Comintern).13 Failing in the latter, the Comintern turned instead ‘to 
winning the Western masses through the creation of a large movement of public opinion 
favourable to the USSR’.14 Foreign delegations to Soviet Russia provided ideal opportunities 
for influencing and manipulating guests. British delegations were the first and, through the 
early 1920s, some of the most frequent guests to be subjected to the Soviets’ new brand of 
cultural diplomacy. And at the heart of this diplomacy was the unlikely—though 
punctiliously calculated—institution of Soviet prisons.  
The article seeks to further the work of Morgan and Davis by examining the 
experiences of the British labour movement of this less obvious and ‘inherently ordinary’ site 
of Soviet cultural diplomacy. Focusing on the visits of the British left to Soviet Russia 
through the early 1920s, with a particular emphasis on the presentation of Soviet prisons, and 
utilizing new material from the Russian archives, it seeks to understand the impact upon the 
left and the consequences for the ongoing tussle between social democracy and communism. 
It presents three findings. First, it demonstrates the development of an intense admiration for, 
and often a desire to replicate, the Soviet penal system in the 1920s. Many British visitors, 
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both moderate and far left, struggled to contain their approbation for Soviet developments in 
penal politics, further strengthening the positive image of the communist state they would 
peddle to the labour movement at home. Soviet prisons proved more than just an attractive 
facet of ‘communism in action’, to be studied and admired from afar. Instead, many 
observers sincerely desired the transposition of these ‘communist’ institutions onto a social 
democratic Britain. Endearing visitors all the more to the fledgling state, these institutions 
became the closest of any Soviet idea to be assimilated into the British socialist programme 
of the 1920s. 
Second, the paper examines the concrete consequences of this approval for British 
socialism. Visits to Soviet prisons reinforced a growing perception among the left of the 
Soviets as ‘progressive’ and humane, parrying the interminable barrage of Conservative anti-
Bolshevik propaganda. Yet despite such admiration, little change was effected in terms of 
Labour Party policy. Through Soviet Russia, the eyes of the left were opened to the issues of 
penal reform, yet Labour gave paltry attention to the matter, let alone attempt to fashion 
Bolshevik-styled prisons in Britain. Soviet prisons appeared to offer a credible, radical 
alternative to the dysfunctional prison regime in Britain, but upon returning home this 
admiration was suffocated by party leaders eager to present Labour as a moderate force 
equipped for government. Russian associations, even those based ostensibly upon humane, 
progressive ideals—and on an increasingly bipartisan issue—were considered too menacing 
to Labour’s prospects when dressed up in Soviet garb. 
Finally, the paper brings these novel perceptions of an unexplored aspect of Soviet 
life into ‘sharper focus’, placing them within the broader framework of the British labour 
movement’s internal tussles over competing notions of social democracy and communism. 
Soviet prisons highlight a unique case in which British guests were subjected to Soviet 
developments that were, on the whole, positive and authentic: guests were not necessarily 
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‘duped’, or wholly misled. And while social democracy ultimately triumphed over 
communism in Britain, the case of Soviet prisons demonstrates that this should not proscribe 
reappraisals of the complexities of this relationship. Despite few policy consequences, a more 
nuanced understanding of the experiences and perceptions of the period highlights the 
significant role of these formative years in cutting across cleavages and skewing the 
normative boundaries that dictated what was acceptable to aspiring social democrats in 
Britain.15 
 
Soviet kul’tpokaz and British interests 
In his Political Pilgrims, Paul Hollander suggested readers would be ‘startled’ to learn that 
among the Soviet institutions which appealed most to foreign guests in the inter-war period, 
‘prisons ... ranked high’. ‘Western visitors, and especially intellectuals’, he claimed, ‘found 
Soviet penal institutions among the outstanding accomplishments of the regime’—a 
perception that continues to form one of the ‘most fascinating aspects of the pilgrimages’ to 
the Soviet Union.16 On the whole, these statements were true for the majority of guests 
hailing from the British labour movement. Throughout the earliest visits of the movement in 
the 1920s it was frequently the case that the Soviet penal system was considered the 
outstanding Bolshevik accomplishment.  
 In early seminal works on fellow-travellers to Soviet Russia, Sylvia Margulies and 
David Caute lamented visitors for lacking ‘the tools necessary to probe beneath the Soviet 
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façade’.17 More recently, these previously reputable exegeses of ‘the blindness of Western 
intellectuals’ in the Soviet Union have been repudiated, based as they were on ideas of a faith 
impervious to rational explanation, a championing of the experimental limits of rationality 
and science, or the ‘alienation and estrangement’ of visitors which underlay their search for 
utopia. As Michael David-Fox notes, following the opening of the Russian archives, single 
master narratives such as these have become insufficient, not least because it is now 
‘increasingly clear that far from all intellectual observers’ of the USSR ‘sought or found 
utopia’.18 This was indeed the case with early British visits. Criticisms were many, but the 
consistently exceptional finding was the Soviet prison. 
 Much of David-Fox’s work revolves around analysis of the Soviet practice of 
kul’tpokaz, or the presentation of culture, developed by the Bolsheviks throughout the 1920s 
and 1930s. A principal feature of kul’tpokaz was the exhibition of ‘model’ Soviet 
institutions—factories, schools, farms, hospitals, prisons—that showcased the best of Soviet 
development, or at least the progress considered most amenable to westerners: genuine 
models (in some cases), yet wholly atypical within the broader Soviet system. The aim of 
these models was to ‘prompt foreigners to generalize from unrepresentative samples’, and to 
foster a ‘favourable picture’ (blagopriiatnuiu kartinu) of the Soviet Union among its guests to 
be disseminated through the reports of delegations.19 Most British delegations and individual 
travellers committed to publishing accounts of their visits, and the Bolsheviks utilized this as 
a key facet of kul’tpokaz. At the conclusion of the first official British labour delegation in 
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May 1920, for instance, Lenin thanked the visitors for ‘having become acquainted with the 
Soviet system ... despite their extraordinary subjection to bourgeois prejudices’—the Soviet 
leader aware of the significance of dispersing knowledge, or indeed misconceptions, of the 
USSR throughout key foreign states.20 Soviet determined analysis of foreigners and the 
state’s tailoring of visits to their interests accelerated dramatically through the 1920s and 
1930s; but for the first British visits of 1919/20, model prison sites were impressive enough. 
 On the eve of the first British visits in 1919, socialists in Britain were being re-
awakened to contemporary issues surrounding the British penal system. Since 1895, when the 
Gladstone Committee reported on the state of British prisons, sparks of great change had 
failed to materialize, instead setting in motion a collection of slow-burning, unexceptional 
reforms. By 1914, a greater challenge to the antiquated Victorian penal system appeared to be 
taking shape through a number of progressive reforms. The Probation of Offenders Act 
(1907), the Prevention of Crime Act and the Children Act (1908), the Mental Deficiency Act 
(1913) and the Criminal Justice Administration Act (1914) introduced borstal training for 
youth offenders, prohibited capital punishment for offenders under the age of sixteen, 
expanded the scope for mitigating factors in determining sentences, and gave greater 
flexibility for paying fines, with the overall effect of reducing imprisonment rates 
substantially.21 
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 These reforms were a corollary of more wide-ranging changes taking place within the 
international field of penal policy. In the early twentieth century, western understandings of 
criminality were distancing themselves from ideas regarding the moral weakness of 
offenders. The Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso’s ‘popularised … notion of genetically 
determined, distinct criminal types’ was promoting the ideas that would prompt the Eugenics 
movement and theories of degeneration; but broader internationalist trends were instead 
focusing on new approaches that rejected the ‘classical’ school of criminology, in which 
criminality was understood as a natural feature of the human condition, and which utilized 
universalized punishments according to the crime committed.22 Emerging ‘neoclassical’ ideas 
rejected the assumption that the rational offender was deterred by punishment, and sought 
more individualized treatments. These approaches also increasingly emphasized the 
formative role of the environment, especially in its economic aspects, in accounting for 
criminality. Based on increasingly empirical studies and positivist methodologies, a new 
transnational epistemic community was materializing, recasting policy debate at the level of 
the International Prison Commission and its quinquennial congresses.23 
 The British left engaged intermittently with these changes, but were less occupied by 
penal reform in general. Nevertheless, a number of woolly socialist approaches to penal 
policy had developed in the late nineteenth century that interacted with both the liberalism 
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and radicalism that informed the politics of emerging left-wing groups in Britain. William 
Morris and the Socialist League, for instance, understood crime as being reducible to the 
issue of private property: under a socialist order, as property and industry were socialized, 
motivations for crime and crime itself would, it was thought, naturally cease. The power of 
public opinion, or civic virtue, in regulating societal conscience was a significant aspect of 
Morris’ utopian approach to crime.24 Other socialists, like Sidney Webb and a number of 
Fabians, advocated sterner punitive treatment and an engagement with emerging Eugenic 
ideas. These notions were represented most brazenly by H.G. Wells, who, alongside George 
Bernard Shaw, intermittently entertained recommendations for isolating and killing 
‘degenerates’, and the use of lethal chambers.25 
 Few other socialists gave much attention to the issue, though exceptions arose in 
Robert Blatchford, owner of the patriotic socialist newspaper The Clarion, and Edward 
Carpenter, the socialist philosopher and activist. Blatchford and Carpenter both advocated an 
end to the dominance of classical theories of criminality, and looked to neoclassical ideas and 
the individualization of the treatment of the criminal, in conjunction with socialist reform, as 
the future of penal politics. Carpenter was a particularly prescient advocate of the 
indeterminate sentence, and like much of the labour movement drew on his liberal heritage in 
                                                     
24 William Morris, News from Nowhere; Or an Epoch of Rest, Being Some Chapters from a 
Utopian Romance (London, 1970 [1890]), 49; 68-71; The Commonweal: The Official Journal 
of the Socialist League, 19 June 1886; Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship and 
Republican Liberalism (Oxford, 1997), 79; Gregory Claeys, Citizens and Saints: Politics and 
Anti-Politics in Early British Socialism (Cambridge, 1989), 113. 
25 John Shepherd, George Lansbury: At the Heart of Old Labour (Oxford, 2004), 61; H.G. 
Wells, A Modern Utopia (London, 2005), 95-6; 100; Anticipations of the Reaction of 
Mechanical and Scientific Progress Upon Human Life and Thought, 3rd edn (London, 1902), 
300-1; Mankind in the Making, 2nd edn (London, 1903), 37; 63-4; 68-72; 99-101. 
 13 
order to attack the uniformity of contemporary methods of punishment in Britain.26 
Following their respective authorial outputs, though, penal reform was seldom discussed until 
the outbreak of war in 1914. 
The war brought penal politics squarely onto the left’s agenda. Scepticism about the 
British prison system intensified as wartime conscientious objectors were arrested, court 
martialled and imprisoned. Conscientious objectors ‘posed moral conundrums in a liberal 
society, especially for Liberal politicians’, and both the Labour Party and the ILP began to 
call vociferously for their release at party conferences.27 Demands by left-wing publications 
intensified as the war proceeded and as figures from the left began to experience for 
themselves the plight of conscientious objectors.28 In particular, the experiences of Fenner 
Brockway and E.D. Morel, both ILP-ers, and the liberal-leaning Quaker, Stephen Hobhouse, 
each of whom were imprisoned, lent them authority as they began to act as mouthpieces for 
the labour movement on issues of conscientious objection and penal reform.29 
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 In 1919, the Executive of the Labour Research Department (LRD) established the 
Prison System Enquiry Committee, claiming the moment ‘opportune for a detailed 
investigation’ to ‘bring new points of view to bear upon the problem’.30 The committee 
would not report until 1922, though, and its remit was in any case restricted to the analysis 
and critique of the current system, rather than planning its reform. The problems were thus 
left unaddressed in the intervening years. Labour and the ILP continued to call for penal 
reform, the release of remaining conscientious objectors, and the pledge of a first Labour 
Government to instigate the required ‘transformation’.31 Penal experiments were monitored 
by the Labour press, but it was to be the left’s visits to Soviet Russia that would most catch 
the eye.32 
 
First visitors, 1919/20 
The first visitors to Russia in 1919/20 formed an enthusiastic group. They included Arthur 
Ransome, journalist and sympathetic witness to the Russian Revolution, M. Philips Price, 
Manchester Guardian correspondent, future Labour MP and Bolshevik sympathiser, and 
H.G. Wells. Other travellers included Professor William T. Goode, another Manchester 
Guardian correspondent, Colonel Cecil Malone—a Liberal MP who converted to the 
communist cause and the CPGB following his visit—and George Lansbury, Labour MP and 
Soviet Russia enthusiast. Prisons were certainly not atop the agendas of these unofficial 
travellers. The ordeals of conscientious objectors, however, ensured the issue held great 
contemporary prominence in labour circles, and the publication by the British Government of 
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confusing and contradictory propaganda on Russian prisons prompted greater interest in the 
topic.33 And it was prisons that stood out during these early visits, each guest admiring the 
institutions they visited. Ransome, for example, inspected several prisons in Yaroslavl and 
chose to dine with Soviet Executive Committee members in the prisons themselves, given 
their ‘astonishingly clean’ facilities and good-quality food. The British prisoners of war he 
saw in the Moscow Butyrka were also said to be treated well.34 
Malone reported positively on the frequency with which minor criminals were 
released from incarceration, praising Soviet emphasis on reform and the practice of granting 
liberty to prisoners for the purposes of employment, provided they returned to their cells by 
evening.35 Goode likewise reported wholly positive experiences of Soviet prisons.36 
Lansbury’s approbation, though, was the fiercest.37 Lansbury felt compelled to search for 
new terms to describe what he saw, for the ‘prisons ... were not prisons in the ordinary sense’. 
‘I can only call them free prisoners ... It was difficult to see where the prison came in’.38 
Lansbury felt a new approach was being cultivated towards criminality in Russia. The 
importance of the deterministic role of the environment as propagated by the Bolsheviks was 
facilitating a new allowance ‘for the causes which bring’ prisoners in, and appeared to 
Lansbury ‘to affect their whole treatment’. The Soviets believed that prisons should be 
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eradicated, and the ‘reformative character’ of the prisons that functioned during Lansbury’s 
visit was, he believed, the beginning of this conquest. In one of the most effusive passages on 
any Soviet subject in his report, Lansbury concluded: the ‘Bolsheviks have led the way in 
being more humane, more considerate in their treatment’ of prisoners ‘than any other 
Government’; they have ‘set the world an example’. ‘Western civilization has something to 
learn from Soviet Russia’.39 
 It is significant that during these early visits Soviet authorities possessed nothing like 
the cultural-diplomatic apparatus which came to dominate future trips of foreigners—the 
‘mass production of delegations’, in the words of Profintern General Secretary, Solomon 
Lozovsky. Their methods were improving all the time, but botched visits still occurred.40 
Consequently, much of what early British visitors saw—and hailed—of Soviet prisons was 
relatively accurate, if not quite the entire picture. 
Peter H. Solomon has demonstrated, for instance, that already in 1919 the Bolsheviks 
were engaging in a moderate and rational approach to the problem of crime, issuing a range 
of decrees that prohibited executions, permitted defence counsel and established a legal 
review system.41 But there were, of course, limitations to these ‘progressive’ trends. Anne 
Applebaum notes the ambivalence of the Soviets towards ‘traditional criminals’, who were 
perceived as potential Bolshevik allies. No special punishments were considered necessary 
for these criminals, as over time the revolution would remove ‘social excess’ as the cause of 
their crimes. ‘Class enemies’, on the other hand, were created by the revolution and required 
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far harsher punishments. Thus, in early Soviet Russia there arose two prison systems: a 
‘regular’ system housing ‘traditional’ criminals and run by the People’s Commissariat of 
Justice (Narkomiust); and a second controlled by the secret police, the Cheka (later the GPU, 
OGPU, and NKVD), that housed class enemies and political prisoners.42 The objectives of 
the ‘regular’ system would have been ‘perfectly comprehensible in “bourgeois” countries: to 
reform the criminal through corrective labour’. The first Bolshevik criminal code would have 
‘warmed the hearts of the most radical, progressive criminal reformers in the West’.43 
In British labour circles, however, the first rosy glow of socialist Soviet prisons had 
little impact for a number of reasons. At a general level, the international development of 
criminology as a social science had been arrested by the First World War, its most overt 
effect being the fifteen-year delay between the convocation of the eighth (1910) and ninth 
(1925) International Prison Congresses. In Britain there was, as a result, no established 
criminological enterprise or contemporary research, and a receptive audience was lacking.44 
Within the Labour Party, the veneration expressed by Lansbury and his fellow travellers was 
continually tempered by the emergence from Russia of conflicting reports of wretched 
conditions, terror and torture in prisons.45 Ambiguity and contradiction among moderates did 
much to dampen enthusiasm, casting doubt upon the veracity of Soviet communism. More 
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significantly, rash policy overhauls were anathema to a party that had matured under the 
gradualist politics of its leader and architect, Ramsay MacDonald. Socialism, for MacDonald, 
would arise from the success of capitalism; there was little need to rush developments on the 
basis of new, flashy ideas.46 
 Labour and the ILP continued to call for penal reform at party conferences, and the 
LRD’s Prison System Enquiry Committee was by now underway, though this was far more 
the result of wartime experience than the discoveries of mercurial Britons in Russia. 
Admiration for the Soviet penal system appeared to run deep among visitors and their rank-
and-file supporters; but under the tutelage of MacDonald little changed with regard to penal 
politics in Britain or the left’s relationship with Soviet Russia. In 1920, the CPGB was 
founded at Moscow’s behest, providing an alternative to Labour on the left in Britain and 
intensifying the struggle between social democracy and communism. 
 
Official visitors, 1920 and 1924 
In May 1920, the constitutionalist social democracy of the Labour Party was put to the test 
against revolutionary Soviet socialism, as the first official Labour-TUC delegation arrived in 
Russia. In the wake of the First World War, the British had assumed the leading role in the 
Second International, and despite the broad ideological composition of the delegation, the 
Bolsheviks prepared to impress, Krasnaia Gazeta proffering impassioned greetings to the 
guests ‘from all our hearts’ (ot vsego serdtsa).47 Overall, the visit ran relatively smoothly. 
Only four members of the delegation—Ethel Snowden, ILP-er and wife of Philip, Margaret 
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Bondfield of the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, Charles Roden Buxton, 
the delegation’s secretary, and George Young, a former Etonian, diplomat and now Labour 
member acting as one of three special advisors to the delegation—visited Soviet prisons.48 
Upon their return to Britain, the delegation published an official report described variously as 
‘an appeal to “fair play”’, ‘enlightening’ and ‘impartial’.49 The shortcomings of Soviet Russia 
were outlined as the delegation had perceived them and, in contrast to earlier visitors’ reports, 
prisons were not mentioned.50 
 Individual reports of the visit, while mostly positive, also showed little interest in 
prisons, and it was the delegation’s only female members who relayed their encounters with 
Soviet prisons.51 Snowden, otherwise so critical of Russia, praised the ‘splendid’ efforts of 
Soviet scientists in ‘the treatment of the morally defective as sick and not wicked people’. 
She also visited the old tsarist prison in the Peter and Paul fortress in Petrograd, describing 
the cells in a curious, somewhat complimentary observation: ‘gloomy’, but ‘twice as big as 
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the cells of an English prison’.52 Bondfield’s visit was equally fleeting, her assessment 
stymied by an inability to overcome the sour odour of the prison bakery. She did conclude, 
however, that inmates had ‘much more freedom’ than their British equivalents, noting the 
prohibition of solitary confinement. Prisoners, she claimed, ‘were probably better off than 
outside’.53 Interestingly, no British guest who had previously been in prison visited a Russian 
penal institution; the practice of comparing domestic prison experiences and ‘new’ Russian 
methods was a tactic that the Soviets would employ effectively throughout the 1920s. 
 On their part, the Soviets revelled in revealing to domestic audiences the ‘special 
delight’ (osobennym vostorgom) and unanimous conclusion (edinodushnomu zakliucheniiu) 
of the delegation.54 Soviet newspapers monitored visitors’ telegrams sent back to Britain, 
while Soviet officials went further and sought to ‘teach’ the delegation exactly what to see 
and what to learn.55 But, once more, the efforts of the Soviets and their British conduits in 
influencing Labour Party policy were stifled, and the concrete consequences of the visit were 
negligible. The most notable impact of the 1920 delegation was perhaps the increased interest 
of Bondfield in the area of penal reform. Bondfield addressed the inaugural conference of the 
Howard League for Penal Reform in 1921, and stressed her view of prisons as ‘utterly 
unnecessary’. Britain had, she declared, to ‘sweep away entirely the old style of prison, and 
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… humanis[e] … our institutions’ so that ‘we may … see the day when there will be no 
prisons left in this country’.56 Bondfield failed to mention her experience of Soviet prisons, 
but it is notable that when the report of the Prison System Enquiry Committee was published 
in 1922, it heralded Russia as having much for Britain to learn from.57  
This, however, was where Russian associations ceased, as the Labour Party now had 
greater concerns. The party’s strategy through the 1920s of maximizing ‘support through … 
broad areas of consensus’ and ‘playing down distinctive policies’ soon began to foster 
electoral success. Designed to displace the Liberal Party in Parliament and to prove Labour’s 
fitness to govern, the approach suffocated radical ideas under the orthodox reign of the ‘Big 
Five’ in the party leadership. The effect was to shore up the gradualist, social democratic 
foundations of the party, to close out the Communists, and to engage with the Soviet Union 
on exclusively pragmatic lines.58 Given MacDonald’s own praise of Menshevik Georgia 
following his 1920 visit, and his antipathy to the subsequent Bolshevik invasion, the diffusion 
of Soviet-styled ideas to the echelons of the Labour leadership was almost impossible. 
Officially, ‘there was already a great distance between Labour and the USSR’,59 but deep 
admiration lingered among many visitors and rank-and-file party members. 
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The next TUC delegation to the USSR came in November 1924. Labour had since 
occupied governmental office for the first time, and had worked hard during its nine months 
in power to forge a new relationship with the Soviet Union through diplomatic and trade 
negotiations.60 The formation of a minority Labour government was a ground-breaking step, 
but for a number of reasons—a limited time in office, a lack of preparation and a 
consciousness of the need for moderation—the government set a modest programme that fell 
short of its previously espoused socialist reconstruction.61 Its greatest achievements came in 
foreign policy, especially regarding relations with the USSR, where MacDonald pursued a 
pro-Soviet policy that had less to do with any shared beliefs than with pragmatism and the 
pursuit of international peace.62 Far less was achieved by the government, however, on the 
issue of penal reform, despite the LRD’s report, English Prisons To-Day, and its stinging 
criticisms of the British penal system. Great faith was placed in the Home Secretary, Arthur 
Henderson, to advance the cause of reform, but his stint in office was characterized by 
caution.63 The regular surfacing of the topic proved of little interest to Henderson, who left 
office following a somewhat unproductive tenure.64  
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In the years since the first delegation to Russia, Soviet prisons had been gaining 
international notoriety, with particular regard to the alleged treatment of non-Bolshevik 
socialists, and the British labour movement responded with its own written protests to the 
Soviet leadership.65 Both the USSR and the labour movement sought, with difficulty, to 
sustain the relationship that had built through 1924, but the bombshell of the Zinoviev letter 
and the ‘red scare’ of the 1924 election left Labour reeling. All the movement’s major 
tribulations appeared to lay at Russia’s door.66 The Soviets were concerned at the ‘strong 
confusion’ (sil'noe zameshatel'stvo) they recognized among the British labour movement, and 
attempted to placate the left in anticipation of the imminent November delegation.67 Rigorous 
British enquiries were anticipated, but the Soviets were nevertheless confident that delegates 
would, following their visit, produce a ‘tremendous and useful [gromadnuiu i poleznuiu] 
work for us’.68 Despite Russia’s perceived role in Labour’s election catastrophe, a ‘shared 
belief in socialism’ still tied many Labourites to the USSR, and the delegation produced the 
‘useful’ work the Soviets desired.69 
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Publishing just one collective report, the delegation praised aspects of Soviet life and 
the state, especially the move towards a more mixed economy under the New Economic 
Policy, understood as an early Soviet compromise.70 Unlike the 1920 report, a great deal of 
interest and detail was committed to the delegates’ experiences of Soviet prisons. A.A. 
Purcell, of the National Amalgamated Furnishing Trades Association, who was chair of the 
delegation, president of the TUC, and the only delegate who also travelled to Russia in 1920, 
epitomized this change, showing far greater interest in the issue.71 Overall, the visitors ‘were 
pleased to see that prisoners in what were once the worst prisons in Europe … are treated 
with a very great humanity, and get good opportunities for a fresh start’.72 Speaking to 
prisoners in the socialist Butyrka in Moscow, the delegation praised the Soviet judicature and 
the decentralized system—the very aspects of the British system criticized by the LRD 
report:  
 
The whole system of prison administration and the treatment of non-political 
prisoners in Soviet Russia is based on the latest theories of criminal psychology. The 
humanising of prison life is a striking feature of the Russian administration … and is 
apparently working with the most excellent results. The atmosphere … is now more 
that of a workshop of free workers than of a house of detention or jail.73 
 
                                                     
70 TUC Library, Fred Bramley Papers, Box 1, B1/22, ‘Signed agreement of delegates’ (n.d.); 
Calhoun, United Front, 124; Davis, ‘Labour’s political thought’, 68-9. 
71 Leningradskaia Pravda, 4 Dec 1924. 
72 TUC, Russia: The Official Report of the British Trades Union Delegation to Russia and 
Caucasia in November and December, 1924 (London, 1925), xvi. 
73 TUC, Russia, 16-17; 132. 
 25 
Detailed portrayals were given of ‘socialist’ prison workshops, the functioning of communal 
dormitories and prisoners’ roles in the operations of the institution. The role of reformation, 
and in particular of bestowing upon inmates useful trades and skill sets, particularly 
impressed the delegation.74 Delegates also sampled prison food (declaring its superiority over 
British equivalents), observed prisoners purchasing goods with their trade union-rate wages, 
and complimented the mixing of male and female inmates.75  
Only John Turner, founder of the United Shop Assistants’ Union, was remotely 
critical of prison institutions. Daniel F. Calhoun claims that Turner, an anarchist who became 
heavily involved in the campaigns of Emma Goldman—the American anarchist deported to 
Russia—against the Bolsheviks’ treatment of political prisoners and the repression of free 
speech, ‘thought prison conditions were wretched’. This is only true in part. Turner 
commented displeasingly on the rumoured conditions of those prisoners held on Solovki, and 
‘sought to have representations made on behalf’ of political prisoners while in Russia.76 But 
he also praised the humane treatment of regular prisoners. Turner’s own protests against the 
Bolsheviks are significant for reinforcing the powerful reach of the Soviets’ kul’tpokaz; for, 
despite his remonstrations, Turner still agreed, in general, with the delegation’s conclusion 
that Soviet prisons were much more humane than even four years prior: ‘[T]he Soviet 
Government was achieving most remarkable results [and] … set[ting] an example that, if it is 
to be followed, will require a fairly radical reorganisation in States that are at present leading 
Europe in these matters’.77 
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International indignation did little to temper the delegates’ zeal for Soviet Russia.78 In 
early 1925 Ben Tillett, a Labour agitator of the Transport and General Workers’ Union, 
published the only individual report of the visit, equally positive in its assessment. And 
epitomizing the uninhibited enthusiasm of the delegation, John Bromley, founding member 
of the General Council of the TUC and an early ILP-er, noted in an unusual interview that if 
he ever had to go to prison, he hoped it would be a Russian prison.79 In the same year, 
Khristian Rakovsky, the Soviet Trade Representative to England, boasted to the Politburo of 
his certainty that the British delegates found Soviet prisons ‘exemplary’ (obraztsovymi). 
Rakovsky was, with good reason, increasingly assured that the Soviets could ‘find sympathy’ 
(mozhno naiti sochuvstvie) for Soviet Communism among the English working classes.80  
Throughout the 1920s the British left remained, in essence, a force for moderation; it 
was not until the fall of the second MacDonald administration (1929-31) that the Labour 
Party lurched leftwards towards socialism. In 1931, at a time of national, financial and 
ideological crisis, Labour sought, in Philip Williamson’s words, ‘soothing socialist images’ 
and ‘truths’.81 Yet, through the 1920s moderation was often effaced at the individual party 
member level in favour of radical, socialist endeavours. Frustrated at the failure of the first 
Labour government to advance socialism, and under the persuasive influence of (perceived) 
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‘socialism in action’ in the USSR, individuals and organizations like the ILP were brought 
into open conflict with the gradualist social democracy of the Labour leadership.82 
Witnessing the alleged construction of communism in Russia brought back with these core 
members of the labour movement not ‘soothing’ images, but ideas that excited and 
galvanized visitors and their followers. Communist ideas of Russian provenance invigorated 
British socialists as Soviet methods blurred the lines between acceptable social democratic 
and communist ideas in Britain. Admiration for the image of the Soviet penal system 
increased; the difficulty continued to lie in carving out the political space in Britain (or 
indeed within the left) ‘to enunciate these socialist “truths”’, and in penetrating Labour Party 
policy. 
 
Walter Citrine visits, 1925 
Unlike Paul Hollander’s readers in the 1980s, British visitors to the USSR after 1925 had 
little reason to be ‘startled’ by Soviet prisons. As the number of foreign delegations visiting 
Russia increased, the showcasing of prisons proved politically expedient, and the number of 
model prisons in Moscow increased accordingly.83 European left-wing organizations praised 
Soviet institutions as ‘comradely’ (tovarishcheskoe) or bearing the stamp of ‘justice and 
kindness’ (spravedlivosti i dobroty), and claimed their replication would ‘benefit all 
mankind’ (pol'zu vsemu chelovechestvu).84 The Soviets were, of course, keen to show off 
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such praise in domestic newspapers.85 Soviet information gathering and the tailoring of visits 
to the ‘political tasks of the moment’ increasingly took in affairs relating to penal politics, 
too.86 In August 1925, the ninth International Prison Congress was due to be held in London, 
the first Congress in fifteen years. Despite not attending, the Soviets kept a close watch on 
the events of the Congress, translating and analyzing international press coverage, with a 
particular focus on the newspapers of the British labour movement.87 
 One month later, TUC Assistant General Secretary, Walter Citrine, crossed into 
Russia with his fellow trades unionist George Hicks. Citrine travelled to the USSR six times 
throughout his life, and admitted to an enthusiasm for early delegations to Soviet Russia.88 
Recent scholarship has highlighted how regularly the visits of Citrine have been overlooked 
in Soviet-Labour history—a curious oversight given his role as a ‘powerful figure in the 
wider labour movement’, ‘in defining its domestic and foreign policies, and its attitudes 
towards communism and the Soviet Union’.89 Citrine’s accounts have shown him to be one 
of the more discerning early travellers. Willing to criticize openly the aspects of the Soviet 
system he disagreed with (the difficulties he saw with the position of trade unions, issues 
surrounding female labour, and the apparent indifference of Soviet politicians to the mass 
poverty he encountered in Russia), Citrine provided pragmatic assessments of Soviet life as a 
whole as he experienced it. Not seeking to make grandiose statements, his accounts are 
arguably some of the most objective.90   
                                                     
85 Izvestiia, 6 Mar 1927; ‘Tiur’ma bez reshetok’, Vecherniaia Moskva, 21 Aug 1927. 
86 David-Fox, Showcasing, 103. 
87 GARF, f. R-4042, op. 1, d. 32, ll. 1-22; f. R-393, op. 1a, d. 167, ll. 1-3, ‘Ob uchastii v 
mezhdunarodnoi tiuremnoi konferentsii’. 
88 Walter Citrine, Men and Work (London, 1964), 88. 
89 Davis, ‘An outsider looks in: Walter Citrine’s first visit to the Soviet Union, 1925’, 
Revolutionary Russia, 26, 2 (2013), 148. 
90 Davis, ‘An outsider looks in’, 151-2; 155-6; 159-60. 
 29 
 Citrine’s unpublished diary reveals his own visit to a Soviet prison in 1925. Citrine 
and Hicks were shown around the Sokol’niki prison in Moscow, and the features of the trip 
mirrored the fixed itinerary established as part of the kul’tpokaz programme—the prison 
workshop, dormitories, co-operative store, kitchen, library, courtyard, theatre and visitor 
rooms.91 The guests were nevertheless impressed by the prison. Citrine looked positively 
upon the chances inmates were given to learn trades and to improve their skills while 
incarcerated, noting the well-stocked prison library. He also praised the communal 
dormitories, the absence of solitary confinement and the apparent good nature between 
guards and prisoners. Most impressive, though, and certainly the most ‘incongruous’ aspect, 
was Citrine’s inspection of the prison theatre. With an amateur orchestra present, the guests 
were asked to listen to some ‘beautiful’ but rather ‘pathetic’ dance music, followed by a 
rendition of the Internationale. Citrine’s response was to ask Hicks: ‘“What sort of place is 
this we have come to? … Is it a Fred Karno gaol or a pantomime show?”’ Hicks could only 
respond that he did not know, ‘“but I cannot imagine anyone wanting to run away”’.92 
 The experience forced Citrine to consider ‘how complex a thing is crime’. Using the 
model of Sokol’niki, the Soviets had successfully presented to Citrine an isolated image of 
progressive, ‘Communist’ penality that matched, and even surpassed, the aspirations of 
western regimes as proposed a month earlier at the Prison Congress in London. And this, 
again, had the desired effect for the Soviets. In March 1926, Citrine’s account of his prison 
visit was published in the Labour Monthly journal. Citrine made clear his role of describing, 
rather than analyzing, what he and Hicks had witnessed, and his pragmatism persisted as he 
claimed: ‘I am not able to verify as to whether the institution we visited is typical of the 
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Russian system, but we were assured that such was the case’. His overriding message was 
that the Soviets were ‘making a whole-hearted attempt’ to exploit ‘reformative treatment’ to 
‘the full’, and he considered it a ‘remarkably interesting and educative’ experiment.93 Citrine 
reflected in his diary that the prisoners he saw in the USSR ‘were not much worse off than … 
if they were in the army or navy in any capitalist state’.94 Despite the moderation with which 
he is associated, as well as his rejection of a majority of aspects of the Soviet political, 
economic and social order, this image of Soviet-styled prisons was one that Citrine was 
willing to countenance under a social democratic system. The progressive ideas sold to 
Citrine through the Sokol’niki prison, dressed up as they were in Soviet Communism, 
complicated the relationship between social democratic and communist norms. 
 Citrine and Hicks returned to Britain in October. In the same year Citrine succeeded 
Fred Bramley as TUC General Secretary, and in the wake of the General Strike of 1926 the 
moderation of Citrine and Ernest Bevin prevailed over the left within the TUC.95 In 1927, the 
Arcos raid ruptured diplomatic relations between Britain and the USSR.96 Within this 
context, Labour continued to chart its course of 1920s moderation, and with Citrine thrust 
headlong into life as TUC General Secretary there was little chance of his fleeting visit to 
Russia having great impact upon Labour policy. Penal reform was intermittently motioned at 
party conferences, but never in connection with socialism or the Soviet Union. In pushing 
moderation, radicalism was suppressed, even relating to a subject as increasingly bipartisan 
as penal reform.97 The future of socialist prison reform, it seemed to many, lay in Soviet 
                                                     
93 Labour Monthly, 8, 3 (1926), 178; 185; Citrine, ‘Diary’, 237; 255; 257-9; 260. 
94 Citrine, ‘Diary’, 255. 
95 Callaghan, ‘“Bolshevism run mad”’, 172.  
96 See Coates and Coates, A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations, 267-90. 
97 See ‘Mr Clynes. 0 Not Out’, Howard Journal, 3, 2 (1931), 3-5. 
 31 
Russia. Yet, half a decade and a national crisis too soon for bold, radical ideas, this socialism 
‘had nothing constructive to offer’ a present dominated by a cautious Labour leadership.98  
 
Conclusion 
Through the late 1920s and early 1930s, prisons continued to form an important part of the 
Soviet practice of kul’tpokaz. Consistently, British delegates upheld the Soviet penal system 
as an ideal worth replicating. As the 1930s progressed, OGPU-operated institutions proved 
incredibly successful for the Soviets, and even Gulag sites proved useful propaganda tools.99  
The experiences of the British left and their attitudes towards Soviet prisons in the 
early 1920s is a novel, but significant, lens through which the development of the relationship 
between the Soviet Union and the British labour movement can be re-examined. Through the 
1920s there developed a strong admiration on the part of the British left for a Soviet penal 
system perceived as humane, progressive and replicable. Prisons and the Soviet penal system 
should be added to the features of Soviet politics and economics that are already recognized 
as having proved attractive to the wider labour movement in inter-war Britain.100 Soviet 
prisons, though, were not merely theoretical attractions. Reports and memoirs of visitors—
both moderate and far left, and even some Liberals—demonstrate that guests perceived this 
revolutionary penal system as an aspect of ‘Bolshevism in action’ that could have been 
directly transposed onto British society, and would have improved the nation as a result. A 
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significant number of Labourite social democrats would have enthusiastically incorporated a 
small slice of Soviet Communism into Britain.  
But this was not to be; the concrete consequences of British admiration were minimal. 
The rosy revolutionary glow of the ideas and practices that British guests witnessed in Russia 
soon dimmed upon their return to Britain—a result not of evanescent support or an oft-cited 
‘British idiocy’, but of a necessary re-engagement with the major domestic issues facing the 
labour movement.101 Visitors returned to a movement built on gradualist, reformist 
foundations; to a Labour Party yet to achieve an electoral majority, locked in a three-party 
political system, and ultimately under-prepared for the stark realities of governmental office. 
Furthermore, with Russian influence came ‘Soviet-inspired problems’.102 That the Labour 
leadership won out in this struggle for ascendancy between communist and social democratic 
ideas is not surprising; the timing was simply not right for radical ideas. What is of 
significance, though, is the variety of figures—from known radicals through to lifelong 
moderates, the CPGB to the ‘Labour Socialist orthodoxy’—who recalibrated their 
understandings of the distinctions between communism and social democracy as a result of 
their experiences of Soviet prisons.103  
The triumph of social democracy should not proscribe reappraisals of the relationship 
between communism and social democracy in Britain, nor between Labour and the USSR. A 
lack of concrete policy consequences does not deny the left’s admiration for what they 
witnessed in Russia, nor negate the importance of the role of these Soviet ideas. Instead, the 
evidence highlights that these relationships were far more complex than is currently 
permitted in the established historiography. Bringing individual subjects into ‘sharper focus’ 
will continue to aid in teasing out the complexities of this area, and future enquiries should 
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extend to other, less explored cultural aspects of Soviet life in order to understand further the 
intricacies of the Soviet-Labour Party relationship, and to offer alternative ways of thinking 
about the creation and adaptations of contemporary British political culture.104 
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